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Abstract 
Mental images can provoke intense emotional states (Holmes & Matthews, 2010). Imagery and 
perception have common neural and physiological mechanisms, including activation of the early visual 
areas (Albers et al., 2013). We tested the prediction that individuals can acquire fear to imagined 
percepts and if this fear transfers to viewing percepts, using fMRI and self-reported measures to 
determine participants’ fear. The participants completed a task in which they viewed and imagined two 
stimuli, and were fear conditioned when imagining the CS+. Participants are only told that mild electrical 
stimulation will be paired with one of the stimuli, but not which stimulus, viewed or imagined. 
Participants completed 6 runs of each task after completing 6 runs of a habituation form of each task. 
Behaviorally, participants report greater fear when imagining the CS+ than imagining the CS-. When 
acquiring fear to an imagined stimulus, we found significant activation in the right insula.  These findings 
are consistent with previous literature indicating that this region is involved in processes related to 
emotional memory, autonomic arousal, and emotion-related motivation. Behaviorally, participants also 
report greater fear when viewing the CS+ than when viewing the CS-, though neither is ever paired with 
shock. When determining if fear is generalized from an imagined precept to a viewed one (i.e., CS+ view 
> CS- view), we found no significant activation. We can conclude that participants generalize the fear 
acquired when imagining the stimulus to viewing the stimulus. Finally, participants also show a similar 
level of self-reported fear to fear conditioning acquired to imagining a stimulus as to when fear is 
acquired to viewing a stimulus. We found insular cortex and precentral gyrus activation when 
investigating the similarities between these processes. These results indicate: that humans can fear 
condition to imagined percepts, which involves activation of anterior insula; that this fear conditioning 
generalizes to instances of viewing the conditioned percept; and that differential conditioning to both 
imagined and viewed percepts produced a similar magnitude of subjective fear along with activation of 
the right anterior insula. 
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Introduction 
“Our fear of monsters in the night probably has its origins far back in the evolution of our 
primate ancestors, whose tribes were pruned by horrors whose shadows continue to elicit our 
monkey screams in dark theaters” (Shepard & Midgley, 1996). This quote brings to light an 
uncommonly thought of concern: mental images can provoke intense emotional states. For 
example, a child imagining a monster under his bed experiences fear, even though he is at no risk 
of harm. In this case, the child has an emotional reaction to situations that are not tangible and 
experienced, rather situations that are constructed in the mind. This thesis seeks to further our 
understanding of how the acquisition and generation of fear produced in the mind’s eye (i.e., 
using mental imagery) relates to, and differs from, fear acquired and generated from external 
stimuli. The overarching hypothesis is that the acquisition and production of fear through the 
imagination is facilitated by a different neural system than fear that is produced through visual 
percepts, but that both pathways lead to the activation of core affect regions involving the 
amygdala and anterior insula.  
The following introductory sections will provide a detailed description of previous 
research from which the overall hypothesis is derived. I will discuss the relationship between 
fear and anxiety in psychopathology and emotions, the similarities between perception and 
mental imagery, emotion and the neural mechanisms involved in fear conditioning learning in 
emotional mental imagery. These topics will converge on the hypotheses of this study followed 
by the methods of the experiment along with the results and their implications.  
Fear, Anxiety, and Psychopathology  
 Psychopathology, such as anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), are rooted 
in fear and imagery (Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007; Shin & Liberzon, 2010). Anxiety can be 
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seen in as much as five percent of the general population (Muse, McManus, Hackmann, 
Williams, & Williams, 2010) and 96 percent of postgraduate students (Erfanmanesh, Abrizah, & 
Karim, 2017). Levels of anxiety, as well as depression, have significantly increased between 
1990 and 2010 (Baxter et al., 2014). This study will further the knowledge and understanding of 
fear acquired to an imagined percept, thereby allowing us to better understand these prominent 
mental health issues. 
 Imagery is a common component of various symptoms associated with PTSD and other 
anxiety disorders (Muse et al., 2010). In such cases, imagery usually involves the recall of 
aversive incidents previously experienced during childhood or when the disorder began 
(Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Muse et al., 2010). This imagery can involve many 
sensory modalities, (Kamitani & Tong, 2005) however, visual elements are most common 
(Hackmann et al., 2000). Imagery is a common feature of PTSD, as individuals often re-
experience the traumatic situation. During imagery in PTSD, individuals experience the 
emotions that occurred during the original traumatic event, which can be triggered either 
intentionally or unintentionally (Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). In anxiety, the imagery 
experienced is often spontaneous and includes aversive memories that have been previously 
experienced or learned (Hackmann et al., 2000; Hackmann & Holmes, 2004). These images are 
believable to the individual, making the imagery difficult to appraise (Hackmann & Holmes, 
2004; Muse et al., 2010). While we don’t have a deep understanding of fear acquired to an 
imagined stimulus, this research shows that this fear can have an influential impact on an 
individual. 
 There are multiple explanations concerning the ability of imagery to evoke emotions. The 
first possible explanation involves the use of similar brain systems for both imagery and 
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perception. The regions that are activated when perceiving a stimulus are also activated when 
imagining the same stimulus (E. A. Holmes & Mathews, 2010). This is also true for imagery of 
emotional stimuli. When participants imagine a face expressing a particular emotion, the same 
regions become activated as when participants view the same face stimulus (E. A. Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010; Kim et al., 2007). Imagery may also be linked to emotions through the robust 
connections between emotional regions such as the amygdala and medial temporal lobe (MTL) 
structures such as the hippocampus. For example, autobiographical memory involving imagery is 
a key factor in remembering (Brewer, 1996; E. A. Holmes & Mathews, 2010) and is influenced 
by the emotional intensity of the stimulus or situation (Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004). 
Imagery and Perception 
Mental images are depictions of stimuli constructed in the mind that cause sensory 
changes in the individual. They allow us to partake in mental events that aid in processes such as 
remembering, planning, navigating, and decision making (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, & 
Kosslyn, 2015). Within the brain, mental images undergo processes similar to that of perception. 
Partaking in mental visual imagery processes interferes with visual perception (Horowitz, 1969). 
This is because mental images retain the sensory characteristics and neural processes of 
perceived stimuli, and utilize information of previously perceived stimuli to generate the image 
(Dadds et al., 1997; Kosslyn, 1988).  
There are two main processes that are required to form mental images. The first is a long-
term memory of the stimuli that will be imagined. The second is the process of generating an 
image. Generating the image uses information from the long-term memory in order to construct a 
short-term mental image (Farah, Hammond, Levine, & Calvanio, 1988). Even though mental 
imagery is formed from memories, the experience of a mental image can be perceived as a 
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present stimulus and cause reactions similar to viewing the image (E. Holmes & Hackmann, 
2004). 
Mental imagery and visual perception share some common underlying neural and 
physiological mechanisms.  Both activate the early regions of the visual cortex (V1-V3) (Albers, 
Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, & de Lange, 2013), though the magnitude of activation is greater for 
viewing compared to imagining (Tootell et al., 1998). Mental imagery, generates only a low 
level of neural activity compared to perception of visual stimuli. This makes studying the neural 
basis of mental imagery difficult. Recent advances in the analysis of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) provides a tool for measuring one’s mental imagery. Despite the low 
neural activity, V1-V3 activation can accurately depict the orientation gratings of imagined 
stimuli (Albers et al., 2013; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). Multivoxel Pattern Analysis (MVPA) is a 
machine learning technique that can be used to analyze the neural patterns in visual areas V1 and 
V2 during perception. This analysis can, in turn, verify the stimuli participants imagine during 
each trial. This not only allows for verification of the mental image produced by participants 
during each trial, but also further supports the similar relationship of mental imagery and 
perception (Albers et al., 2013; Cichy, Heinzle, & Haynes, 2011; Kamitani & Tong, 2005; 
Pearson et al., 2015). 
Another similarity in neural responses between imagined and viewed stimuli is pupil 
restriction. When imagining a stimulus, the amount of pupil constriction is similar to what is 
found based on the brightness of the same viewed visual stimuli (Laeng & Sulutvedt, 2014). 
These similarities indicate a strong connection between mental imagery and perception (Albers 
et al., 2013; Dadds et al., 1997; E. A. Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Kosslyn, 1988). The similar 
visual cortex activation, as well as an individual’s ability to mentally produce an image may 
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influence the individual’s task performance (Logie, Pernet, Buonocore, & Della Sala, 2011; 
Pearson et al., 2015). Though there are clear similarities in the neural mechanisms of imagery 
and perception, their levels and patterns activation are not uniform (Ganis, Thompson, & 
Kosslyn, 2004). These similarities suggest a relationship between mental imagery and 
perception, which we will investigate further in the proposed study.   
Fear and Emotion 
A consensus definition of emotion remains lacking in the literature. This study will 
follow an operational definition derived from James Gross, indicating that emotions are a 
psychological state consisting of behavioral expression as well as physiological response. It will 
also follow the guidance of James Gross’ modal model (Figure 1).  According to this view, 
emotions are connected to emotion-eliciting situations, which can either be reflected in the 
external environment or be internally generated (Gross & Feldman Barrett, 2011). Specifically, 
following the introductory example of a child becoming scared of a monster under his/her bed, 
we argue that situations can be internally generated. Therefore, emotions can be linked to mental 
imagery.  
 
Figure 1. Gross’ modal model of emotion (Gross & Feldman Barrett, 2011). 
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Pavlovian fear conditioning is widely used to provoke emotional states (Cheng, Knight, 
Smith, & Helmstetter, 2006; Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2008; Knight et al., 2005). This 
process involves a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS), such as a tone or image, paired with an 
unconditioned stimulus (US), such as mild electrical stimulation or an aversive noise, which is 
followed by an unconditioned response (UR), such as fear, pain, or autonomic arousal. This 
pairing results in the conditioned stimulus that was paired with the US (CS+) producing a 
conditioned response (CR) that includes factors similar to the UR, most notable a feeling of fear 
or threat reactivity along with autonomic reactivity. Most often, experiments employ differential 
fear conditioning, which along with the CS+, includes a conditioned stimulus that is never paired 
with the US (CS-).  
Neural Activation and Fear Conditioning 
Skin Conductance Response (SCR) is widely used in many types of studies for its ability 
to measure psychological states through sweat gland activity. It has been shown that SCR is a 
reliable variable used to measure autonomic emotional expressions(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
1998). Fearful situations, a combination of stimulating arousal and unpleasant affective valence, 
have been shown to increase SCRs. When presented with happy, sad, peaceful, and fearful 
music, participants produced the largest SCR to fearful pieces (Khalfa et al., 2002). SCR has also 
been used in classical conditioning. During training, participants show a larger SCR to CS+ trials 
than CS- trials, signifying greater emotion to the CS+ stimulus than the CS- stimulus 
(Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2007; Knight et al., 2005). The occurrence of a CS+, the 
increase in amygdala activity, and SCR are related (Cheng et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2003; 
Knight et al., 2005).  
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It has been shown that the expectation of a US during the presentation of a CS+ 
modulates brain activity in humans (Dunsmoor et al., 2008). The amygdala is thought to 
moderate memories and successfully form a CS-US association in Pavolvian fear conditioning 
(Cheng et al., 2006; Dunsmoor et al., 2007; Knight et al., 2005; LeDoux, 2000; Maren & 
Fanselow, 1996). The amygdala, however, does not require conscious awareness of a stimulus 
for this fear association to be made (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999). The colliculo-pulvinar-
amygdala pathway, involved in autonomic responses and reflexive reactions, allows relevant 
qualities of an individual’s environment to be identified regardless of awareness (Büchel & 
Dolan, 2000; Cheng, Knight, Smith, Stein, & Helmstetter, 2003; Morris et al., 1999). The 
amygdala also moderates the production of an individual’s conditioned SCR. This means that 
during the occurrence of a CS+, the increase in amygdala activity and SCR are related (Cheng et 
al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2003; Knight et al., 2005). 
Additional cortical regions appear to be involved in a conditioned response. The insula, 
as well as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, generate a larger response during uncertain or partial 
conditioning trials (Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2001; Dunsmoor et al., 2007; Ploghaus, 
Becerra, Borras, & Borsook, 2003). This is also true of emotionally salient stimuli (Adolphs, 
2002; Wicker et al., 2003) in both younger and older adults (Lee et al., 2018).The posterior 
insula aids in modulating the emotions caused by an uncertainty of receiving a painful stimulus 
(Sawamoto et al., 2000).  
The insula is responsive to processes involved in fear memory (Dunsmoor et al., 2007; 
Merz et al., 2010) and monitoring emotions (Britton et al., 2006). Insula activity correlates with 
emotional stimuli, as well as uncertainty. When conditioning is not reinforced on 100 percent of 
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the trials and is therefore less predictable, greater activity is shown in the insula (Dunsmoor et 
al., 2007).  
Fear and Imagery 
Though there has been no research on how fear conditioning, and the generalization of 
acquired fear between perceiving and imagining, one study has examined the role of imagery in 
the acquisition of emotional conditioning. Lewis et al. (2013) sought to determine if mental 
imagery could be associated with emotion-evoking photographs. During the learning phase, 
participants were to associate a letter cue with the associated pattern. When the letter was 
presented, participants would imagine the associated pattern, then view a pleasant or aversive 
photograph (Figure 2). Participants then completed the test phase in which the pattern was 
presented, followed by a pleasant or aversive photograph. When the image was displayed, the 
participants were to indicate whether the stimulus was pleasant or aversive (Figure 3).  
  
Figure 2. Learning phase. Participants 
imagine the pattern associated with the Letter cue 
then view an emotional UCS (Lewis, O’Reilly, 
Khuu, & Pearson, 2013). 
Figure 3. Test phase. Participants 
must indicate whether a UCS is aversive or 
pleasant (Lewis et al., 2013). 
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This study used reaction times to determine if the emotional content was properly 
associated with the pattern presented. If reaction times were quicker, then participants accurately 
associated the pattern with the emotion of the image during the learning phase. When collapsing 
across emotions, they found quicker reaction times based on emotional congruence, meaning 
reaction times were faster when the pattern’s emotion matched the image’s emotional content. 
Therefore, they concluded that associative learning connected the emotional content of images 
and mentally generated stimuli (Lewis et al., 2013).  
This study, however, contains limitations which the study proposed in this thesis will 
address. First, there was no imagining during the test phase. This leaves a gap in which 
generalization must be assumed from learning to test phase, rather than verified and tested. Also, 
the associative learning and emotional responses relied on response time. While the results 
produced an effect, and showed this associative learning occurred, we are unable to determine 
the nature of the emotional response. As the study was entirely behavioral, it cannot speak 
directly to the underlying neural processes responsible for associative learning involving imagery 
(Lewis et al., 2013). 
Study Purpose: Integrating the neural and subjective bases of fear learning 
Little is known about how the differences between imagery and perception are important 
for emotion, the neural processes that are involved in emotional mental imagery, and how the 
range of complexity in emotional images is represented in the mind. The purpose of this study is 
threefold: 1) To determine if we acquire fear to imagined percepts, and the neural underpinnings 
of this process; 2) To determine if fear acquired to imagined percepts generalizes to matching 
visual percepts, and the neural underpinnings of this process; 3) To determine if fear acquired to 
imagined CSs is distinct from fear acquired to viewed CSs, and the neural underpinnings of this 
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process. While it has been shown that mental images can be used as an emotion evoking stimuli 
and this association can generalize from imagined to perceived stimuli (Lewis et al., 2013; 
Pearson et al., 2015), these inferences rely solely on faster reactions times to emotionally 
congruent stimulus presentations. The study by Lewis (2013) did not involve self-reported 
measures of affect, physiological markers of emotional learning such as SCR, or have the neural 
mechanisms of these processes been observed. Moreover, the mental processes that occur 
through fear learning in mental imagery and how this process is similar to that of perception. In 
the current study, we will compare participants’ capacity to generate a fear response to both 
viewed and imagined stimuli. Identifying and quantifying the transfer of fear from a imagined to 
viewed  stimuli, provides new knowledge regarding the processes and mechanisms of fear 
learning in the brain. The next section provides a detailed exposition of our hypothesis and their 
rationale.   
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Hypotheses 
There are three main purposes of this study. First, to determine if we acquire fear to 
imagined percepts (hypothesis 1). For this point, we expect greater levels of activation in the 
CS+ condition compared to the CS- condition. Second, to determine if fear acquired to imagined 
percepts generalizes to matching visual percepts (hypothesis 2). Here we expect participants to 
generalize this fear acquired in hypothesis 1 from imagined to viewed stimuli. Third, to 
determine if fear acquired to imagined CSs has distinct neural signatures from fear acquired to 
viewed CSs (hypothesis 3). We expect similar magnitude of fear, as indicated by the self-report, 
but different neural mechanisms in this assessment. These hypotheses are addressed below. 
Hypothesis 1 
All analyses for hypothesis 1 use the CS+ imagine and CS- imagine conditions from the 
Imagery Acquisition phase. We expect participants to have a greater self-reported fear of the 
CS+ imagine condition than the CS- imagine condition. In fMRI scans, when the unconditioned 
stimulus is paired with the conditioned stimulus during the task, the amygdala produces a 
response for the CS+ but does not produce a response during CS- trials (Dunsmoor et al., 2007). 
Therefore, during Imagery Acquisition, greater amygdala activity is expected for the CS+ 
imagine than the CS- imagine. An increase of activity in the insula has also been found during 
differential fear conditioning tasks (Lee et al., 2018). Due to this, we also expect greater insula 
activity when presented with the CS+ imagine than the CS- imagine.  
Hypothesis 2 
All analyses for hypothesis 2 use the CS+ view and CS- view conditions from the 
Imagery Acquisition phase. We predict fear conditioning to an imagined stimulus will produce a 
generalized fear response such that viewing the imagined stimulus produces fear. Therefore, as 
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in hypothesis 1, we expect participants to have a greater self-reported fear of the CS+ view 
condition than the CS- view condition. Again, as in hypothesis 1, we expect the neuroimaging 
data to result in greater amygdala and insula activity when viewing the CS+ as compared to 
viewing the CS-. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 analyses use both the Imagery Acquisition and Visual Acquisition phases. 
The self-reported data includes the CS+ imagine condition from the Imagery Acquisition phase 
and the CS+ view condition from the Visual Acquisition phase. Here we expect to find no 
significant difference between the CS+ imagine and the CS+ view conditions in the self-reported 
Likert style questionnaire, indicating that participants produce a subjective fear of similar 
magnitude when acquiring fear to an imagined and a viewed stimulus. 
The first fMRI analyses use both the difference between CS+ imagine and CS- imagine 
conditions from the Imagery Acquisition phase, as well as the difference between the CS+ view 
and CS- view conditions from the Visual Acquisition phase. When investigating this interaction, 
we expect to find activation in both the amygdala and insula, such that the magnitude of 
activation in each region is larger when viewing than imagining. In the second set of fMRI 
analyses, we use the CS+ imagine condition from the Imagery Acquisition phase and the CS+ 
view condition from the Visual Acquisition phase. This contrast allows us to investigate the 
activation in regions associated with imagining versus viewing. Here we expect to find greater 
activation in the frontoparietal regions when imagining. When viewing, we expect greater 
activation in the visual cortex and the thalamus. When investigating the neural similarity 
between acquiring fear to an imagined stimulus and acquiring fear to a viewed stimulus, we 
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expect to find significant differential (CS+ > CS-) activation irrespective of acquisition type 
(viewing or imagining) in the anterior insula and amygdala.   
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Method 
Participants 
A power analysis using NeuroPowerTools, a sample size calculation tool for fMRI 
experiments based on statistical mapping, was conducted to determine the ideal sample size for 
this study (Durnez et al., 2016). Data from a previous similar fMRI study was used as pilot data 
in this analysis. To achieve a statistical power of 0.8 with an alpha of 0.05, this study will 
assemble a sample size of about 30 participants. This study includes 33 healthy adults between 
the ages of 18-45. These participants had no neurological disorders, did not self-report as having 
a clinically diagnosed mental illness, nor were they on any pharmacological intervention for any 
mental illnesses. Participants were also required to have no metal in their body due to MRI 
safety. Two participants were not included in the subsequent analyses due to technical equipment 
errors. All participants gave written informed consent and the study was approved by LSU’s 
institutional review board. 
Participants also completed a demographic form, the Vividness of Visual Imagery 
Questionnaire (VVIQ), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), and the Attentional Control 
Scale for potential secondary post hoc analyses. For example, the activation of an individual’s 
early visual cortex while imagining correlates to their VVIQ score (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van 
Gerven, 2017). Individuals with high anxiety have shown increased activity in the amygdala 
when confronted with aversive stimuli (Indovina, Robbins, Núñez-Elizalde, Dunn, & Bishop, 
2011). Having these measures will allow us to look at individual differences, yet such analysis 
are beyond the scope of the current study. 
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Task Design 
To determine whether fear can be acquired for imagined stimuli, and the generalizability 
of this fear to viewed stimuli, four Gabor patches were adopted as conditioned stimuli (CSs). The 
schedule of stimulus presentation and data collection was controlled by PsychToolbox in Matlab 
R2015b (MathWorks Corp., Natrick, MA, USA). Mild electrical shock was used as the 
unconditioned stimulus (US) and was delivered to the index and middle finger of the non-
dominant hand via a shock stimulator MP-150 BIOPAC system (BIOPAC systems, Goleta, CA). 
The intensity of the electric shock was set at a level that was “uncomfortable but not painful”, as 
determined by each participant individually, consistent with previous research (Cheng et al., 
2006; Cheng et al., 2003; Knight et al., 2005; LaBar et al.; Tabbert et al.). Trials that included 
shocks were excluded in subsequent analyses.  
This study involved two independent conditioning phases, each using a unique set of 
stimuli; the Imagery Acquisition phase consisted of left and vertical Gabor patches while the 
Visual Acquisition phase included horizontal and right patches. Along with the patches 
presented, the major difference between these sets was the stimuli associated with the mild 
electrical stimulation. In the Imagery Acquisition phase, the mild electrical stimulation was 
presented during 50% of trials in which the participant imagined either the left or vertical patch, 
while in the Visual Acquisition phase, the mild electrical stimulation was presented during 50% 
of trials in which the participant viewed either the horizontal or right patch (Figure 4). This 
reinforcement rate allows a measurement of CS+ evoked hemodynamic responses without the 
effect of the US confounding the data. This approach was successful at eliciting a conditioned 
response of non-reinforced CS+ trials compared to CS- trials. The order in which the sets were 
presented was counterbalanced between subjects.  
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Figure 4. Layout of sets, Gabor patches, and mild electrical stimulation. Every 
participant both views and imagines all four patches but are only shocked to one imagine patch 
during Imagery Acquisition and one view patch during Visual Acquisition. 
 
Prior to each conditioning phase, participants completed a habituation task consisting of 
one run, before each phase. One run consisted of 12 trials, or 12 Gabor patches. The presentation 
of patches is discussed in more detail below.  During this habituation task, participants were 
instructed to view and imagine each patch to be presented in the associated set. The conditioning 
task consisted of four runs of each set in which during the Imagery Acquisition, either the 
imagined left or imagined vertical patch was paired with the electric shock, and in the Visual 
Acquisition, the perceived right or perceived horizontal patch was paired with the electric shock. 
The patch chosen as a conditioned stimulus with shock was counterbalanced across participants. 
Each trial in the conditioning session began with the onset of a white fixation dot against a gray 
background for 2 seconds. Participants were then presented with a black fixation dot and an 
auditory cue to direct them to either view or imagine the patch, lasting 1.5 seconds. The black 
fixation dot continued to appear for 4 additional seconds while the participant either attended to 
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the presentation of a patch or imagined the patch dictated by the auditory cue. Participants were 
instructed to relax and stop imagining when the black dot disappears. If the trial was assigned to 
the CS+ with shock condition, a shock was delivered for 5ms at the end of the 4 second 
presentation, followed by a white fixation dot for 10 seconds (Figure 5). During the CS- and CS+ 
without shock trials, there was no shock and the 4 second interval was followed by a white 
fixation dot for 10 seconds. Participants were informed that one of the patches were to be paired 
with shock but they were not told which patch was selected.  
 
Figure 5. Trial structure for the fear conditioning task. A total of 12 trials are presented 
in semi-random order. Imagery-Acquisition: Participants are shocked when imagining a 
stimulus. Visual Acquisition: Participants are shocked when viewing a stimulus. 
*Stimulus enlarged to show patch 
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A total of 12 trials were presented in semi-random order during both the habituation and 
the task. In the Imagery Acquisition, the following conditions were presented: 2 CS+ imagine 
with shock, 2 CS+ imagine without shock, 4 CS- imagine, 2 CS+ view, and 2 CS- view. A CS- 
imagine was always the first trial, followed by a CS+ imagine with shock trial, while the other 
CS+ imagine with shock trial was presented randomly within the second half of the task, and a 
CS- imagine trial was always presented last. In the Visual Acquisition, the following conditions 
were presented: 2 CS+ view with shock, 2 CS+ view without shock, 4 CS- view, 2 CS+ imagine, 
and 2 CS- imagine. A CS- view trial was always presented first, followed by a CS+ view with 
shock trial, while the other CS+ view with shock was presented randomly within the second half 
of the trials, and a CS- view trial was always presented last.  
Before going into the scanner, participants completed all consent, forms, and 
questionnaires. They were also given written instructions of the task to be sure they were aware 
of the task. Participants were also shown a slide show about the MRI, MRI safety, and an 
overview of what would happen in the scanner. When participants went into the scanner, first an 
anatomical scan (T1) was run. Participants then completed the shock threshold task to determine 
what level the electrical stimulation should be for the remainder of the study. For one set, the 
habituation task was presented for 6 runs with no shocks given, then the conditioning task was 
presented for 6 runs with shocks given. The Likert style questionnaire regarding the set was then 
completed. Participants then repeated the habituation task, conditioning task, and Likert style 
questionnaire for the second set. 
Measures 
Fear contingent responding is assessed using a Likert style questionnaire, SCR, and 
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). After each set, the participants completed a 
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Likert scale questionnaire (1-7, higher value indicating greater fear) in which they reported the 
vividness of their mental imagery for the respective imagine patches, how hard they tried to form 
mental images for the respective imagine patches, and how much they feared the shock on the 
respective view and imagine patches. A copy of the questionnaire is included in Appendix 1.  
Physiological Recordings: Individual SCRs were acquired to confirm the success of the 
emotional arousal manipulation by electrodes placed on the ring and pinky finger of the non-
dominant hand. All physiological data were recorded at 1000 Hz sampling rates through the MP-
150 system (BIOPAC System, Goleta, CA, USA), connected to a grounded RF filter, leads, and 
electrodes.  
Due to the time consuming nature of fMRI and SCR analyses, SCR has not yet been 
analyzed for this study. This psychophysiological data will be analyzed in the future for 
publications, but was disregarded here as it requires additional time and attention for accurate 
cleaning and analyses. 
Image Acquisition and Analysis. Brain images were collected using a 3 Tesla GE 
Discovery MR750w system with a 32-channel matrix head coil at Pennington Biomedical 
Research Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Functional images were acquired using a gradient-
echo, echo-planar, T2-weighted pulse sequence (TR= 2000 ms, TE= 25 ms, flip angle = 90°, 64 
x 64 matrix, phase encoding direction posterior to anterior). Thirty-six slices covering the entire 
brain were acquired with an in-plane voxel resolution of 3.5 x 3.5 and a slice thickness of 3.5 
mm with no gap. Slices were acquired in interleaved ascending order, and 112 functional 
volumes were acquired in each run, not including 3 discarded dummy volumes to account for T1 
equilibrium effects.  
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A T1-weighted high-resolution image was acquired using a three-dimensional 
magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient (MPRAGE) sequence (TR= 2000 ms, TE= 3.8 
ms, flip angle= 8°, 176 x 256 matrix, phase encoding direction posterior to anterior). 256 slices 
covering the entire brain were acquired in interleaved ascending order with a voxel resolution of 
1 x 1 x 1 mm. 
The following fMRI analyses were conducted using FEAT (FMRI Expert Analysis Tool) 
Version 5.0, part of FSL [FMRIB’s Software Library] (Smith et al., 2004). The following 
preprocessing steps were applied; motion correction using MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, 
Brady, & Smith, 2002); slice-timing correction using Fourier-space time-series phase-shifting; 
non-brain removal using BET (Smith, 2002); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 
FWHM 7mm; grand-mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single 
multiplicative factor; registration to high resolution structural and standard Montreal 
Neurological Institute (MNI) 2-mm brain using FLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002).  
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Results 
There were three hypotheses tested with this study. The first hypothesis investigates 
whether participants can acquire fear to an imagined stimulus. The second hypothesis determines 
whether participants generalize this fear to the respective viewed stimulus. Lastly, the third 
hypothesis states that fear acquired to imagined and viewed stimuli will be similar in magnitude 
in core affect regions but capitulated by different neural mechanisms. The data from the 
habituation runs and data from the imagine conditions in the Visual Acquisition phase are not 
presented here as they are not relevant to the hypotheses that are currently being tested. Each 
hypothesis will be addressed for each measure collected below.  
Likert Style Questionnaire 
Self-Reported Vividness and Effort. At the end of each phase we asked participants to 
rate their vividness and effort used to create a mental image of each imagined stimulus. There 
was no significant difference in the self-reported vividness levels of the CS+ imagine (M=5.03, 
SD=1.56) and CS- imagine (M=5.00, SD=1.41) conditions in the Imagery Acquisition set, t(30)= 
0.11, p=0.91. There was also no significant difference in the self-reported vividness levels of the 
CS+ imagine (M=4.93, SD=1.53) and CS- imagine (M=5.03, SD=1.56) conditions in the Visual 
Acquisition set, t(30)= 0.47, p=0.64. When looking at the amount of effort put towards 
generating a mental image, we also find no significant difference in the amount of effort used to 
generate a mental image to the CS+ imagine (M=5.17, SD=1.56) and CS- imagine (M=4.77, 
SD=1.55) conditions in the Imagery Acquisition phase, t(30)=1.75, p=0.09. Again, we do not 
find a significant difference when looking at this same comparison between the CS+ imagine 
(M= 4.97, SD=1.54) and CS- imagine (M=5.33, SD=1.35) conditions in the Visual Acquisition 
phase t(30)=1.78, p=0.09. These comparisons indicate that the stimuli are all of equal difficulty.  
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Hypothesis 1. To investigate whether participants generated a subjective fear response to 
the CS+ imagine stimulus in the Imagine Acquisition phase, an independent t-test showed a 
significant difference between the imagine CS+ (M=4.58, SD=1.88) and imagine CS- (M=1.97, 
SD=1.58) condition, t(30)= 6.352, p< .001 (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. CS+ Imagine and CS- Imagine self-reported fear during Imagery 
Acquisition. Black dot indicates mean. 
 
Hypothesis 2. An independent t-test was also run on the view CS+ (M= 2.61, SD=2.06) 
and view CS- (M=1.42, SD= .96) conditions in the Imagine Acquisition condition to determine 
whether participants generated a subjective fear response to the CS+ view condition (Figure 7). 
A significant difference was found between these two conditions, t(30)=3.16, p=.003. This 
indicates that the subjective fear response acquired to the imagined stimulus generalized to the 
viewed stimulus.  
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Figure 7. CS+ View and CS- View self-reported fear during Imagine 
Acquisition. Black dot indicates mean. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Finally, to address the hypothesis that fear acquired to imagined and fear 
acquired to viewed stimuli will be similar in magnitude, an independent t-test was run on the 
CS+ imagine condition from the Imagery Acquisition phase and the CS+ view condition from 
the Visual Acquisition phase. This test indicated no significant difference when fear is acquired 
to an imagined stimulus (M=4.5, SD=1.85) and when fear is acquired to a viewed stimulus 
(M=3.83, SD=2.07), t(30)=1.67, p=.11. 
a 2x2 ANOVA was conducted, with the condition (CS+ and CS-) and set type (Imagine 
Acquisition task and Visual Acquisition task) as within subject variables (Figure 8).  There was a 
main effect of the condition, F(1, 30) = 43.73, p < .001 (MCS+ = 4.17 vs MCS- = 1.97), indicating 
that the CS+ is greater than the CS- regardless of which set it is being presented in. To verify this 
main effect, follow-up t-tests were run. As in hypothesis 1, an independent t-test showed a 
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significant difference between the imagine CS+ (M=4.58, SD=1.88) and imagine CS- (M=1.97, 
SD=1.58) conditions from the Imagery Acquisition phase, t(30)= 6.352, p< .001. The t-test 
investigating the view CS+ (M=3.83, SD=2.07) and view CS- (M=1.93, SD=1.44) conditions 
from the Visual Acquisition phase was also significant, t(30)=4.83, p<.001. In the 2x2 ANOVA, 
there was no significant main effect of set type, F(1, 30) = 2.11, p = .16. This indicates that 
regardless of which condition was presented, the Imagine Acquisition and Visual Acquisition are 
not significantly different. There was also no significant interaction of the type of condition and 
set type, F(1, 30) = 1.79, p = .19. Due to the significant main effect of condition and lack of 
significant main effect of set type, this indicates that both sets have similar levels of self-reported 
fear for their respective CS+ and CS- conditions.  
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a.  
b.  
Figure 8. Self-reported fear. A. CS+ Imagine and CS- Imagine self-reported fear during 
Imagine Acquisition. B. CS+ View and CS- View self-reported fear during Visual 
Acquisition. 
Black dots indicate mean. 
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fMRI 
A whole-brain approach was used for the following analyses. 
Hypothesis 1.  Similar to the Likert style questionnaire analysis, to determine the ability 
of participants to acquire fear to an imagined stimulus, a whole-brain analysis between the 
imagine CS+ condition and the imagine CS- condition from the Imagine Acquisition were 
compared, resulting in a difference of activation (CS+i – CS-i). This resulted in right insula 
activation (1487 voxels; max z stat = 3.89; X = 36, Y = 14, Z = -14 ; Figure 9). No significant 
difference of activation was found in the hippocampus or visual cortex as predicted in the 
hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Insula Activation was found in the right insula when comparing CS+ 
Imagine to CS- Imagine in Imagery Acquisition. 
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Hypothesis 2. Again, similar to the Likert style questionnaire analysis, to determine if 
participants generalize the fear acquired in hypothesis 1 to the respective viewed stimulus, the 
viewed CS+ and viewed CS- conditions from the imagery acquisition set were compared (CS+v 
– CS-v). Using whole-brain analyses, no significant clusters of activity following thresholding 
and multiple comparisons correction were found. 
Due to no whole brain activation, we conducted a region-of-interest analysis using the 
right anterior insula cluster we found to be significantly active during the acquisition of fear 
conditioning to imagined stimuli. This analysis compared the difference of the viewed CS+ and 
viewed CS- conditions from the imagery acquisition set. No significant difference was found 
between the viewed CS+ (M= 0.08) and viewed CS- (M=0.20) conditions, t(1,30) = .92, p = .37.  
Hypothesis 3. Two analyses were performed to assess two aspects of the third 
hypothesis. First, to compare the neural mechanisms of fear acquired to imagined and viewed 
stimuli, we investigated the interaction between the difference of imagine CS+ and imagine CS- 
condition from the Imagine Acquisition and the difference between the view CS+ and view CS- 
condition from the Visual Acquisition [(CS+i – CS-i) - (CS+v – CS-v)]. The whole brain 
analysis revealed no areas of significant differential activation.  
 Second, to investigate differential activation in regions associated with imagining versus 
viewing a fear conditioned stimulus, we compared the imagine CS+ from the Imagine 
Acquisition and the view CS+ from the Visual Acquisition (CS+i - CS+v). Activation in the 
visual cortex (9355 voxels; max z stat = 6.3; X = 26, Y = -90, Z = 12; Figure 10) was greater 
when viewing than imagining. We did not find differential activation in the frontoparietal regions 
or thalamus for either view or imagine. 
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a.  b.   
Figure 10. Activation found in the visual cortex when comparing CS+ Imagine 
from Imagery Acquisition to CS+ View from Visual Acquisition a. sagittal view b. 
horizontal view. 
 
A conjunction analysis was used to determine the similar regions of activation between 
the difference of the imagine CS+ and imagine CS- condition from the Imagine Acquisition 
(CS+i – CS-i) and regions of activation of the difference of the view CS+ and view CS- 
condition from the Visual Acquisition (CS+v – CS-v). While the whole-brain and region of 
interest analyses we conducted previously result in a difference of activation, the conjunction 
analysis results in activation which is the same between the comparisons, [(CS+i – CS-i) ∩ 
(CS+v – CS-v)]. Two clusters were found (Figure 11). The first cluster (Figure 11, light blue) 
was found at the frontal operculum cortex/insular cortex (422 voxels; max z stat = 1; X = 37.4, Y 
= 22.4, Z = 2.45). The second cluster (Figure 11, dark blue) was found at the central opercular 
cortex/precentral gyrus (91 voxels; max z stat = 1; X = 56.9, Y = 7.91, Z = 5.52).  
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Figure 11. Two clusters, the Frontal Operculum Cortex/Insular Cortex (light 
blue) and the Central Opercular Cortex/Precentral Gyrus (dark blue) were found in the 
conjunction analysis of the difference of the imagine CS+ and imagine CS- condition 
from the Imagine Acquisition phase with  the difference of the view CS+ and view CS- 
condition from the Visual Acquisition phase   
 
 
   
 
  
   
30 
 
Discussion 
This study focused on mental imagery in the acquisition and generalization of fear. We 
did this using 2 tasks. In the Imagine Acquisition task participants were fear conditioned to an 
imagined stimulus while in the Visual Acquisition task participants were fear conditioned to a 
viewed stimulus. We assessed the participants’ fear subjectively and the underlying neural 
mechanisms using fMRI. Overall, we found that participants self-reported fear to an imagined 
stimulus, this fear then generalized to viewing the same stimulus, and the magnitude, as well as 
the neural mechanisms, of fear are similar when acquiring fear to an imagined or a viewed 
stimulus.  
In this study, we found that participants have a subjective fear when being fear 
conditioned to an imagined stimulus. When being fear conditioned to an imagined stimulus, 
neural activation was found in the insula. We also found that this subjective fear generalizes to 
viewing the same stimulus, even though participants are were never fear conditioned to the 
viewed stimulus. No neural activation was found during generalization, which leaves the 
mechanisms for this generalization unknown at this time. Hypothesis 3, tested the similarities 
and differences when being fear conditioned to an imagined stimulus versus when being fear 
conditioned to a viewed stimulus. A similar magnitude of self-reported fear is found between the 
imagined and viewed fear. We also find significant overlapping activation in the insular cortex 
and precentral gyrus when assessing the neural activation produced by differential fear acquired 
to an imagined stimulus and fear acquired to a viewed stimulus. Finally, we find greater visual 
cortex activation when viewing a stimulus than when imagining a stimulus. 
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Acquiring fear to imagined percepts 
The present study demonstrated that participants self-report fear to mental images of 
visual stimuli. Specifically, participants subjectively reported being more afraid when imagining 
the CS+ compared to when imagining the CS-. Our findings are consistent with the findings of 
Lewis et al. (2013), who found that participants can form a learned association during mental 
imagery as evidence by improved reaction time showing participants accurately associate the 
pattern with the emotion of the image during the learning phase. Our self-reported findings show 
that participants are not only able to acquire fear to an imagined stimulus, but also that they are 
aware of this learned fear and experienced a state of fear.  
One limitation of the self-reported fear is that it was acquired at the end of all 6 runs in 
the session rather than trial-by-trial. Therefore, our self-report results also required a subjective 
memory component such that participants recall the state they were in during the different 
conditions. While self-reporting can have limitations such as participant expectations, the 
consistency with previous research (Lewis et al., 2013) and the fMRI findings indicate that 
participants did differentially condition to the imagined CS+ compared to the CS-. Moreover, 
whereas we observed differential self-reported findings for subjective fear, on our other self-
reported measures participants did not differentiate between imagery effort or imagery vividness.  
Similar to previous research using differential fear conditioning we found that the 
anterior insula was more activated when forming a mental image of the CS+ compared to the 
CS- (Lee, Greening, et al. 2018). The insula has also been found in differential conditioning with 
partial reinforcement (Dunsmoor, Bandettini, & Knight, 2007). More broadly, while most 
research into fear appears to focus on the role of the amygdala, there are several examples of 
research implicating the insula including prominent theories of emotion (Damasio & Carvalho, 
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2013). For example, bilateral insula damage has been shown to have no effect on emotions, 
including pleasure, happiness, sadness, irritation, and others (Philippi et al., 2012). This has led 
to a focus on subcortical areas, such as the brain stem, as the primary source for basic emotions. 
It is now postulated that because the insula is not necessary for emotions, the emotions begin at 
the brain stem and are represented in the insula (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). Furthermore, the 
insula is in a connection to multiple pathways such as memory, language, and reasoning, 
suggesting the insula may be necessary for the introduction of emotions to cognitive processes. 
This thinking identifies the insula as the “crosswalk between feelings and cognition” (Damasio 
& Carvalho, 2013).  
Fear generalization following imagery acquisition 
The present study demonstrated that participants generalize self-reported fear acquired to 
an imagined image to viewing the image. Specifically, participants subjectively reported being 
more afraid of the CS+ view compared to the CS- view, even though they were never 
conditioned to the view condition. These findings are related to those of Lewis et al. (2013), 
experiment 1. Lewis et al. (2013) used a method in which generalization must be assumed when 
participants were tested on the association made between an emotion and imagining. The 
participants imagined images in the learning phase only and not the testing phase. The results of 
Lewis et al. (2013) showed that participants did retain the association between the emotion and 
image as participants had quicker reaction times when the pattern presented matched the image’s 
emotional content, indicating that generalization was found and is possible (Lewis et al., 2013). 
Our study addressed the limitation of Lewis et al. (2013) in which the generalization from 
learning to testing was not tested directly. Lewis et al. (2013) included voluntary mental imagery 
within their association phase but this mental imagery was not used in the testing phase (Lewis et 
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al., 2013). By having participants imagine the stimulus during testing, we were able to verify that 
fear is still associated with a stimulus that is viewed, even though the unconditioned stimulus 
(i.e., the mild shock) was only ever delivered when participants were imagining the CS+. This 
subjective, self-reported fear also indicates that participants are aware of the fear they have 
acquired and generalized from the imagined to viewed stimulus.  
In terms of the mechanisms for this generalization, the whole brain analysis found no 
significant clusters of activity following thresholding and multiple comparisons correction. We 
also conducted a region-of-interest (ROI) analysis using the right anterior insula cluster we found 
that was significantly active during the acquisition of fear conditioning to imagined stimuli. No 
significant difference was found between the viewed CS+ and viewed CS- conditions in the right 
anterior insula cluster. 
One possibility is that we require additional subjects to observe the generalization effects 
with a whole brain analysis. A power analysis conducted prior to the study indicated that 30-40 
participants would be necessary to gain appropriate power. With 31 participants collected, it 
might be necessary to accumulate more participants, increasing the power and allowing these 
analyses to more accurately reflect the underlying mechanisms.  
Comparing fear conditioning to imagined vs viewed percepts 
This study found a similarity in magnitude of subjective fear when fear conditioned to 
viewing a stimulus as compared to when fear conditioned to imagining a stimulus. This could 
indicate that participants are just as afraid of an imagined image as a viewed image. This finding 
is novel and has not been investigated previously, even though mental health disorders such as 
anxiety and PTSD show real life examples of the ability for the mind to generate strong negative 
emotions to an absent threat stimulus (Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007; Shin & Liberzon, 2010).  
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Treatment plans have been developed using imaginal exposure for PTSD in which 
patients recall the traumatic event, focusing on senses, thoughts, and emotions that occur. These 
treatments have been found to be effective in reducing negative effects of PTSD (Mueser, 
Yarnold, & Foy, 1991; Bryant, Moulds, Guthrie, Dang, & Nixon, 2003; van Minnen & Foa, 
2006) This imaginal exposure can also be combined with imagery rescripting in which PTSD 
patients are to use the imagination to change the traumatic imagined event, giving the patients 
control of the situation and allowing the imagination to overcome the fear it has created (Arntz 
et al., 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & Christianson, 2007; Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007). 
Through having this research and a better understanding of fear and mental imagery, we can 
begin to assess why these treatments work and how to possibly make them even better.  
We also found greater activation in the visual cortex when participants view the feared 
stimulus than when they imagine it. This is consistent with previous research that has shown 
increased visual cortex activation when viewing stimuli than imagining stimuli as compared to 
baseline, though they both produce activation (Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 2017).   It has 
also been found that the visual cortex is sensitive to viewing various line orientation (Kamitani & 
Tong, 2005). With determining that the visual cortex is more active when viewing than 
imagining, further research to investigate the potential of generalizing the feared mental image to 
various line orientations may allow us to investigate the similarities between the neural networks 
of imagined and viewed stimuli, particularly when these have strong emotional components.  
Why no amygdala? 
Many older studies have commonly associated the amygdala with fear and fear 
conditioning (Büchel, Morris, Dolan, & Friston, 1998; Cheng et al., 2006; Dunsmoor et al., 
2007; LaBar et al., 1998; Tabbert, Stark, Kirsch, & Vaitl, 2005). However, recent research is 
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finding more specificity is needed on the amygdala’s role in fear conditioning. A Pavlovian 
conditioning, positron emission tomography (PET) study found right amygdala activation during 
masked angry faces when compared to unmasked angry faces  (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998). 
Another study had a similar finding regarding amygdala and fear in masked images. This 
particular PET study recruited participants with a fear of snakes or spiders. The study showed 
images of snakes, spiders, and masked mushrooms. Activation in the left amygdala was found 
during both feared and non-feared (but fear-relevant) stimuli as compared to the masked 
mushrooms. There was no difference, however, between the feared and non-feared stimuli, 
indicating that the amygdala responds to the threat of a stimulus, rather than the feared stimulus 
itself (Carlsson et al., 2004). 
These studies of the amygdala in fear commonly refer to implicit fear, which we now 
know has different neural mechanisms than explicit fear (Knight, Waters, & Bandettini, 2009). 
While the amygdala was previously seen as “the fear center of the brain,” it does not fully 
explain fear and there are separate cortical and subcortical pathways that are involved in fear 
conditioning (LeDoux, 2000). In the study presented, we had participants rate their subjective 
level of fear. The findings from the self-reported levels of fear indicate that the participants are 
aware of their increased fear to the CS+ than the CS-, suggesting an explicit fear rather than 
implicit. Therefore, a lack of finding in the amygdala is not entirely unexpected. 
Two meta-analysis on the neural mechanisms involved in fear conditioning not only 
found no amygdala activation, but also consistently found activation of the anterior insula 
(Fullana et al., 2016; Mechias, Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010). A study on the activation of the 
amygdala and insula during fear in participants with and without PTSD also showed similar 
results in that amygdala activation was found in participants with PTSD, but only insula 
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activation was shown in healthy participants (Bruce et al., 2012). Yet another study focusing on 
fear conditioning using auditory CSs found increased insula activation without any amygdala 
activation (Lee et al., 2018). Even when focusing on music-evoked emotional processing a study 
found increased insula activation during fear based music but no amygdala activation (Koelsch, 
Skouras, & Lohmann, 2018).  
 Over the past roughly 20 years that fMRI has been used to research the inner working of 
the brain, there has been much improvement and progress not only on the methods and tools 
used to acquire the images, but also on those used to analyze the data. With newer techniques 
and increased knowledge on the brain, we must reassess our findings and build upon what we 
have previously learned. With more knowledge and tools comes better results, which may be 
what is occurring with our increased understanding of the amygdala and insula in fear. This is a 
topic that should continue to be studied and improved upon with our increased understanding of 
fMRI and way to analyze the images. 
Future directions 
Future research will be needed to determine how specific versus indiscriminate the 
generalization of fear is. For example, it has been found that conditioned responses can be 
generalized along perceptual similarity in animals (Guttman & Kalish, 1956). More specifically, 
fear in humans can generalized across faces that are perceptually similar (Dunsmoor, Mitroff, & 
LaBar, 2009). Fear learning can also be influenced by similarity in concepts, such as a spider and 
a spider web (Dunsmoor, White, & LaBar, 2011). What we do not know, however, are the limits 
of fear generalization in imagination, and if these results previously found in perception also 
apply to fear during imagination. 
   
37 
 
Skin conductance response is another possible future analysis. We expect the SCRs to 
parallel the behavioral findings, indicating that participants produced the greatest fear of 
imagined CS+ stimuli when fear conditioning to an imagined stimulus. We also expect the SCRs 
to follow this same pattern while generalizing this fear that was acquired to imagining to viewing 
the same CS+ stimuli which was never fear conditioned to. In this case, we expect the SCRs to 
indicate that participants produce a greater fear of viewing the CS+ than viewing the CS- when 
participants are never fear conditioned to viewing the stimuli. And again, we expect the SCRs to 
follow the behavioral results in hypothesis 3 in that the SCRs generated when imagining the CS+ 
when fear is acquired to imagining the stimulus, and the SCRs generated when viewing the CS+ 
when fear is acquired to viewing the stimulus are similar in magnitude.  
As amygdala influences conditioned fear autonomic responses (Cheng et al., 2006; 
Cheng et al., 2003; Knight et al., 2005) we expect those with higher amygdala activity to also 
produce higher SCRs. We expect those with higher amygdala activity to produce higher SCRs, 
though we expect greater activation for the conditioned stimulus than for the generalized 
stimulus. We expect the SCRs to parallel the behavioral findings, indicating that participants 
produced the greatest fear of viewed CS+ stimuli while generalizing this fear to imagined CS+ 
stimuli. 
Now that we have determined that fear to an imagined stimulus is similar in magnitude to 
fear of a present stimulus in hypothesis 3, we need to begin to determine exactly what aspects are 
similar and different in these two processes. More specifically, for example, does fear extinction 
occur similarly when extinguishing the fear of an imagined stimulus versus extinguishing the 
fear of a viewed stimulus? Is extinguishing fear to an imagined stimulus easier or more difficult 
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than extinguishing the fear of a viewed stimulus? Are the methods for extinguishing fear in 
imagined stimuli and viewed stimuli similarly effective or should they be treated differently?  
Lastly, using MVPA, we can measure the mental imagery of our participants. Previous 
studies have been able to use MVPA to accurately depict the orientation gratings of imagined 
stimuli, despite there being low neural activity (Albers et al., 2013; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). 
This tool allows the neural patterns in visual areas V1 and V2 during perception and can verify 
the stimuli participants imagine during each trial. This analysis will also further support the 
relationship between mental imagery and perception. 
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Conclusion 
Through this study, we have discovered that it is possible to generate fear to an imagined 
stimulus, this fear can then generalize to viewing the same stimulus, and the fear acquired 
through imagination and perception have a similar magnitude of fear but capitulated by different 
neural mechanisms. It also provides further support, in addition recent research, of the 
importance of the insula, rather than the amygdala, in emotions. This could indicate that 
participants generate a fear response to mental images, this fear is also present when viewing the 
same image, and fear acquired to mental images and viewed images produce a similar magnitude 
of fear. 
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Appendix 1. Imagery Acquisition Phase Likert Style Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was presented as a powerpoint to participants in the scanner, in which 
they are able to verbally communicate their responses to the researcher.
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Appendix 2. Visual Acquisition Phase Likert Style Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was presented as a powerpoint to participants in the scanner, in which 
they are able to verbally communicate their responses to the researcher. 
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